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Bertrand Russell presented an influential critique of Philoponus’s traversal 
argument for a beginning of time in its Kantian form. I consider his criticisms 
and point out that they rely on metaphysical claims about the nature of time, 
causation, and the scope of non-contradiction. They are not merely logical 
criticisms. Russell relies on a Platonic atomist metaphysics to defend those 
claims. Yet, as I also point out, that metaphysics is not obviously true and 
Russell’s arguments for it are weak. Russell often talks as if his metaphysics 
arises out of merely logical considerations. However, his metaphysics cannot 






In 529 CE John Philoponus (Ioannis Philoponos) presented an influential 
argument for the claim that time must have had a beginning. In the 
eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant revived and modified that argument.2 
Today, Philoponus’s argument is widely thought to be invalid. Modern 
criticisms usually state or build on criticisms put by Russell against Kant’s  
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Chris Mortensen and Paul Oppenheimer for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper. 
2 For Kant, the traversal argument is part of one side of an antinomy of pure reason; a pair of 
apparently sound arguments for opposite conclusions that rely on the fundamental 
metaphysical principles we legitimately use to interpret parts of our world, but we use 
illicitly when we deal with our world as a whole (Wood, 2010). He wants to argue that 
reason reaches its limits of coherence when it attempts to tackle questions such as the 
infinity or finitude of time. He is also focussed on the beginning of the world, not on time 




restatement of the argument. In his later work, Russell sometimes talks as if 
the argument fails for logical reasons and accuses Kant of making some 
elementary logical blunders. These remarks by Russell seem to have been 
the ones that influenced recent discussions. For instance, in a recent book on 
infinity, Graham Oppy restates and expands on Russell’s points (Oppy, 
2006:116–117).3 
I have pointed out in an earlier paper that Philoponus’s version of the 
argument is not merely logical. It relies on metaphysical premises. When 
these premises are spelt out, the argument is valid, though it may be 
unsound (Couvalis, 2013). Kant’s version of the argument also relies on 
metaphysical premises, in particular, views about the nature of time and 
causation that are spelt out earlier in the Critique. Some of those premises are 
similar to premises in Philoponus. As we shall see, Russell’s initial critique 
of Kant’s argument was based on a metaphysical account that was radically 
different to that of Kant and Philoponus. Russell seems later to have 
forgotten that his critique is dependent on a metaphysical account. That 
metaphysical account involves an assumption that, following Peter Hylton, 
I will call Platonic atomism. Platonic atomism assumes the eternal, mind 
independent, and separate, existence of items, whether they are abstract 
objects, non-existent objects, or objects in the empirical world. Russell 
initially adopted Platonic atomism under the influence of G.E. Moore. He 
thought it could save philosophy from the absurdities of British idealism; for 
instance, the doctrines that all relations are internal and that mathematics is 
riddled with inconsistencies.4 
  
                                                          
3 Oppy treats Kant’s argument as being merely about any successive merely mathematical 
series. He fails to note that Kant is talking about a series in time, and that Kant is relying on 
a theory of the nature of time. Like many modern analytic philosophers who break 
arguments away from their context, he fails to understand what Kant means by 
“successive” and the like. In any case, it is now well known that Kant in the antinomies is 
not talking about logical necessities, but about what he thinks is necessary synthetic a priori. 
By contrast to recent analytic philosophers, the early Russell often shows that he knows he 
is arguing against complex metaphysical theories. 
4 The key paper is the now neglected Moore, 1899. Moore’s paper presents an eternalist view 
of time six years before Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity appeared in print. For a full 
account of Platonic atomism, see Hylton, 1990:105–166. 
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Philoponus’s argument and Kant’s restatement 
 
Philoponus’s traversal argument in Against Proclus is aimed at the Neo-
Platonist and Aristotelian view that that the universe is necessarily 
everlasting. It does not just target the specific views of the fifth century Neo-
Platonist Athenian philosopher/mathematician Proclus.  
Philoponus starts by stating some arguments for the claim that there 
cannot be actual infinities. However, he then indicates that despite these 
arguments, it might be thought that there could be a spatial infinity. He goes 
on to argue that even so, there cannot be an infinite past time:  
 
[F]or it would seem much more impossible to claim that the infinite is brought 
to actual birth bit by bit and, as it were, to be counted out one unit (monas) 
after another than that it exists all at once and at the same time. For if it exists 
all at once, perhaps there will be no need to go through it unit by unit, and 
actually, as it were, count it off; but if it comes to be a bit at a time and one 
unit always exists after another, so that eventually an actually infinite number 
of units has come to exist, even if it does not exist all at once at the same time 
because parts of it have ceased to exist while parts [still] exist, it has 
nevertheless become traversable, which is impossible. [But] this — I mean the 
traversing of the infinite by, as it were, counting it off unit by unit — is 
impossible, even if the counter were everlasting. For the infinite is by its 
nature untraversable; otherwise it would not be infinite. (Philoponus, 
1899:10; 2005:24) 
 
What is the extra impossibility to which Philoponus alludes? To 
understand him, consider that he has a dynamic theory of time in which 
equal non-zero sized units of time come into existence successively. He tells 
us elsewhere that time has its being in becoming and flowing.5 As a 
consequence, he is saying this: If a unit of time is to exist at all, it must first 
be present before it is past (or ceases to exist). A later unit of dynamic time   
                                                          
5 See Couvalis, 2017 for a detailed explanation of Philoponus’ view of becoming and the flowing 
now. Philoponus does not conceive of time as an eternally given series laid out from earlier 





can only come into existence if an earlier unit has come into existence (been 
present) before it. This means that every unit of a dynamic series time must 
have once been present. The units of time come into existence (and recede 
into the past, if they continue to exist) at a regular rate.6 This implies that no 
unit of time can recede infinitely into the past (or have ceased to exist 
infinitely long ago). Philoponus states his argument as if we were traversing 
a unit at a time forwards at a uniform rate, or counting forwards at a uniform 
rate. This is because he thinks the now can be described as if it is moving 
forwards at a uniform rate. Indeed, he elsewhere tells us that time is 
constituted by the flow of the now. My reconstruction of the traversal 
argument is spelt out in an appendix at the end of this paper. I defend the 
reconstruction in Couvalis, 2013. 
Here is Kant’s version of the argument:  
 
For if one assumes that the world has no beginning in time, then up to every 
given point in time an eternity has elapsed, and hence an infinite series of 
states of things in the world, each following another, has passed away. But 
now the infinity of a series consists precisely in the fact that it can never be 
completed by successive synthesis. Therefore an infinitely elapsed world-
series is impossible, so a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its 
existence ... (Kant, 1998:470; B454)  
 
It is important to grasp that Kant’s version of the argument is stated as 
part of an overall argument that includes a separate argument against the 
possibility of an infinite space; an argument which relies on different 
premises to those he uses to argue against an infinite past time. Like 
Philoponus’s argument, Kant’s argument for a beginning of the world does 
not rely on his arguments about infinities in general.  
We can quickly see from the reference to “successive synthesis” 
(successive adding on) that Kant is thinking of time as dynamic and that the 
underlying argument is much the same as the argument in Philoponus. 
Earlier remarks by Kant make clear that the argument relies on the view that 
the coming into being of what are now past states of things in the world is a  
                                                          
6 I explain what this means, and how Philoponus can evade problems raised by McTaggart, in 
Couvalis, 2017. 
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pre-condition of the coming into being of later states of things in the world 
(Kant, 1998:462, B438–439; Wood, 2010:247–248). The reference to having 
passed away makes clear that Kant also thinks of the states as first having to 
be present before they pass away. This also echoes features of Philoponus’s 
argument. Kant’s view of other aspects of time is different to that of 
Philoponus, but that is not relevant to the merits of the argument. Kant is 
vaguer than Philoponus, but it is clear that the argument is much the same. 
 
Russell’s philosophical outlook 
 
As we will see, in his early work, Principles of Mathematics, Russell shows 
that he understands that Kant’s argument is based on underlying 
metaphysical premises about the nature of time. Indeed, as Peter Hylton has 
shown, much of Principles is intended to replace with a new account the 
Kantian and Hegelian account of the metaphysics of the world to which we 
apply mathematics. This is why Principles includes chapters on the 
philosophy of the continuum, the infinite, causation, matter and motion. 
Russell’s preference for what might seem to be a merely logical approach to 
problems is actually a preference for a Platonic atomist version of Platonist 
metaphysics. 
Russell relies explicitly on a Platonic atomist critique of Aristotelian 
accounts of change in giving a radical account of change when he says that:  
 
The notion of change has been much obscured by the doctrine of substance, 
by the distinction between a thing’s nature and its external relations, and by 
the pre-eminence of subject-predicate propositions. It has been supposed that 
a thing could, in some way, be different and yet the same: that though 
predicates define a thing, yet it may have different predicates at different 
times. Hence the distinction of the essential and the accidental, and a number 
of other useless distinctions, which were (I hope) employed precisely and 
consciously by the scholastics, but are used vaguely and unconsciously by the 
moderns. Change, in this metaphysical sense, I do not at all admit. The so-
called predicates of a term are mostly derived from relations to other terms; 
change is due, ultimately, to the fact that many terms have relations to some 
parts of time which they do not have to others. But every term is eternal, 




immutable (Russell, 1903:sec. 443). (‘Whatever may be an object of thought, 
or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call 
a term’. (Russell, 1903:sec. 47))  
 
To see the impact of Russell’s view on his solution to ancient 
metaphysical puzzles, consider his discussion of the use of Weierstrass’s 
nineteenth century mathematics to solve Zeno’s paradox of the arrow. 
Russell states the paradox as “[I]f everything is at rest or in motion in a space 
equal to itself, and if what moves is always in the instant, the arrow in its 
flight is immovable” (Russell, 1903:sec. 332). He comments that:  
 
Weierstrass, by banishing all infinitesimals, has at last shown that we live in 
an unchanging world, and that the arrow, at every moment of its flight, is 
truly at rest. The only point where Zeno probably erred was in inferring (if 
he did infer) that, because there is no change, therefore the world must be in 
the same state at one time as at another. (Russell, 1903:sec. 327) 
 
As Hylton says  
 
[W]hat is striking here is Russell’s immediate leap from mathematics to the 
metaphysics of change ... Platonic atomism implies an a-temporal, and 
therefore static, way of thinking of the world. Russell, however, claims this 
way of thinking is forced on us by modern mathematics, at least if we want 
to employ this subject to give us a consistent theory of motion. (Hylton, 
1990:194) 
 
Compared to old style Platonism, what is odd about this Platonic 
metaphysics is that Russell not only thinks there is a world of abstract 
objects; he also collapses the world of everyday reality into the world of 
mathematics understood in the light of modern logic. He is aware of the 
distinction and will sometimes admit that the underlying assumptions of 
mathematics might not match the real world (e.g. Russell, 1926:154ff.). More 
commonly Russell takes the very fact that a mathematics gives us the only 
available consistent picture of the world that avoids paradoxes as evidence 
that it is true of the world. We have leapt from the mathematical to the 
metaphysical.  
By contrast to Russell, Plato and the ancient Neo-Platonists distinguished 
our world of becoming and flow from the world of the eternal paradigm,  
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which is truly real. On their view, the empirical world only imperfectly 
realised the paradigm, particularly in things that are flowing. Plato tells us 
that time is a moving image (kiniton eikon) of eternity (aionion), created 
because it was impossible (ouk in dinaton) for the demiurge to create an exact 
likeness of the eternal unity (Timaeus, 37d). The Neo-Platonist Damascius 
distinguishes between the static form of a river, and the river, which has its 
being in flowing and becoming (Simplicius, 1882:798, 16–20; 1992:121). 
Philoponus was trained in this Neo-Platonist tradition and took over some 
features of it into his Christianity. His version of the Christian god is a 
timeless being (Philoponus, 1899:6; Philoponus, 2005:22). 
  
Russell’s central criticism of the Traversal Argument7 
 
Russell produces an argument against Kant’s argument in Principles which 
is: 
 
‘Completion by successive synthesis’ seems roughly equivalent to 
enumeration, and it is true that the enumeration of an infinite series is 
practically impossible. But the series may none the less be perfectly definable, 
as the class of terms having a specified relation to a specified term. It then 
remains a question, as with all classes, whether a class is finite or infinite; and 
in the latter alternative … there is nothing self-contradictory. (Russell, 
1903:sec. 435) 
 
His point is spelt out more clearly in his 1914 work, Our Knowledge of the 
External World (OKE), when he says: 
 
To begin with, it is a mistake to define the infinity of a series as ‘impossibility 
of completion by successive synthesis’. The notion of infinity … is primarily 
a property of classes, and only derivatively applicable to series; classes which 
are infinite are given all at once by the defining property of the members, so 
that there is no question of ‘completion’ or of ‘successive synthesis’. (Russell, 
1926:160) 
  
                                                          
7 Russell produces some other criticisms of the traversal argument in OKE (Russell, 1926:161). 
Oppy also produces similar arguments. I have dealt with such arguments as put by Richard 




Consider the natural numbers starting with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 ... We can define 
this bunch of numbers, by saying that it is a class in which the first member 
is zero and each successive member is one greater than its predecessor. We 
have apparently defined the series all at once. 
I do not want to go further into the detail of Russell’s definition of infinite 
series here. It is irrelevant, for Kant’s argument is about a series of things in 
a temporal world. We may be able to coherently define an infinite series all at 
once, but that is not relevant to whether the real thing, time, is given all at 
once. If it comes into existence by successive synthesis (literal adding on of 
something that did not exist before), then what we do in defining time is 
misleading as to time. Russell slips from talking about the world of 
mathematical definition to talking about the time world. He assumes that 
the time world exists eternally, as if it were given all at once. On its own, his 
criticism is fallacious.  
Russell complains in OKE about “the inveterate subjectivism” of Kant’s 
mental habits and suggests an account of how Kant might have arrived at 
his argument which has no basis in Kant’s text (Russell, 1926:161). However, 
it is Russell’s inveterate Platonism that is the problem here. Using a phrase 
invented by German philosophers, Russell talks as if what is true of Plato 
Himmel — the Platonic heaven of mathematical objects — must be true of 
the real thing, time. Definitions of things in Platonic heaven have been 
converted into definitions of things in the real world.  
It is odd that Russell does this in OKE, because elsewhere in the same 
work he shows that he is perfectly aware that what is true of mathematical 
representations might not be true of the actual world. Nevertheless, in 
Principles Russell shows that he has some understanding of the metaphysical 
background to Kant’s argument. He comments that:  
 
[I]t seems, however, that previous events are regarded by Kant as causes of 
later ones, and that the cause is logically prior to the effect. This, no doubt, is 
the reason for speaking of conditions, and for confining the antinomy to events 
instead of moments. If the cause were logically prior to the effect, this 
argument would, I think be valid; but we shall find ... that cause and effect 
are on the same logical level. (Russell, 1903:sec. 435)  
 
Russell grasps that on Kant’s view the coming to be of an earlier state is 
a necessary condition for the coming to be of a later state. However, he  
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misleadingly describes it as a logical priority, thereby squeezing it into a 
timeless logical relation as if it could not be something different. In fact, it is 
clear from Kant’s discussion that Kant thinks of the necessity not as logical, 
but as synthetic a priori. For Kant, logic is analytic. Note also that an earlier 
state is not a cause per se if we mean by “cause” a sufficient condition, the 
activity of some causal power, or an inus condition.8 It is unlikely that Kant 
would have accepted that necessary conditions as such are causes. I do not 
know of a thorough discussion of causation in Philoponus, but it is hard to 
believe that he would have accepted that necessary conditions are causes per 
se. 
 
Russell on causation 
 
Russell intends his analysis of causation to be an important part of the 
underlying argument against Kant. By the time he wrote OKE, he seems to 
have forgotten that an important part of his critique of the traversal 
argument is his account of the nature of causation. It is presented as if it were 
a merely logical argument. As we have seen above, the merely logical 
argument is toothless, for the way in which we define series need have 
nothing to do with the way in which they come into existence. 
My next quote from Russell will indicate that he presented a claim about 
causation which was meant to underlie his critique of Kant.9 It is worth 
explaining that claim in a little detail so that we can understand Russell’s 
metaphysical assumptions better. In Principles, Russell states a principle 
which he says is vital to dynamics. The principle is: 
 
that cause and effect are equal … All equations, at bottom, are logical 
equations, i.e. mutual implications; quantitative equality between variables, 
such as cause and effect, involves a mutual formal implication. Thus the 
principle in question can only be maintained if cause and effect are placed on 
the same logical level, which, with the interpretation we were compelled to 
give to causality, it is no longer possible to do. (Russell, 1903:sec. 473) 
  
                                                          
8 For an account of inus conditions, see Mackie, 1974:62. 
9 Gottlind (1952) and Trainer (2008) point out that Russell drew back from his radical claims 
about causation in his later work. He allowed that “cause” had a legitimate use. I am here 




Russell’s central claim can be put by saying that the ordinary notion of 
causation (“the interpretation we were compelled to give to causality”) is an 
unscientific one. Scientific laws are at the centre of science. Laws do not have 
a direction of causation built into them. From current states of the world we 
can calculate what past states of the world are like just as from present states 
we can calculate future states. This claim can be put more clearly by saying 
that there is in reality nothing more to causation than what is involved in 
formal implications that go in both directions in time. Those formal 
implications are to be cashed out in the logic invented by Frege and Russell 
(now misleadingly called “classical logic”). 
The point is put more clearly in a 1913 essay in which Russell tries to state 
the correct version of the law of causality which he thinks underlies science, 
when he says that: 
 
[T]he law makes no difference between the past and the future: The future 
‘determines’ the past in exactly the same sense in which the past ‘determines’ 
the future. The word ‘determine’, here, has a purely logical significance: a 
certain number of variables ‘determine’ another variable if that other variable 
is a function of them. (Russell, 1992:203) 
 
Russell’s reliance on logical considerations is brought out further when 
he criticises the argument that the past is different from the future because 
we cannot change the past, but can bring about the future. He says: 
 
We all regard the past as determined simply by the fact that it has happened; 
but for the fact that memory works backward and not forward, we should 
regard the future as equally determined by the fact that it will happen … You 
cannot make the past other than it was — true, but this is a mere application 
of the law of contradiction … But also you cannot make the future otherwise 
than what it will be; this again is an application of the law of contradiction. 
(Russell, 1992:206) 
 
Russell takes it as obvious that the law of contradiction applies to the 
future despite the fact that there are well known arguments going back to 
Aristotle that it does not (e.g. Aristotle, On Interpretation, ix). If the past is 
fixed, it is not obvious that it is fixed merely because of the law of non-
contradiction rather than because events in it have already happened. 
Russell assumes logical or mathematical laws are explanatory of features of 
the world. Because Russell takes it that non-contradiction is logically basic, 
he thinks it cannot be testable through what we find out about the world. It  
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must apply to all the world — past, present, and future. This seems to be in 
serious tension with his professed empiricism. Similarly, at the start of 
Principles, he tells us that he is dealing with pure mathematics and hence 
with hypotheticals, but then he turns to telling us that he is dealing with 
space, time and motion — which are real things (Russell, 1903:secs 1 & 2).10 
Russell also treats the way memory works as if it is an unexplainable 
accident. However, an obvious explanation of why memory works that way 
is that evolution has wired us that way to aid our survival because the future 
depends on our actions in a way that the past does not. The scientific 
principle of evolution by natural selection arguably has a non-eternalist 
assumption built into it. Russell ignores the obvious explanation because the 
only science that counts in his discussion of causation is a narrowly logical 
interpretation of mathematical physics.  
It is striking that Russell quickly assumes that all there is to causation 
must be captured by logical features of the equations. He does plausibly 
argue that some common-sense views and Bergson’s view about causation 
don’t adequately explain what happens in physics, but those are the only 
views he considers. Why should we assume that all that is going on in 
causation is what is captured by the equations? After all, the two sides of the 
equations refer to items in the world which have their own properties, and 
many equations refer to time. Why does Russell not consider in detail 
whether it is the case that the properties of these items and of time might 
include features not captured by these equations? As far as I can tell, he does  
                                                          
10 In the second edition (1938) introduction to Principles Russell says that in his definition of 
pure mathematics he wanted to include both Euclidean and Non-Euclidean geometry 
without saying whether the axioms are true (Russell, 1938:vii). Yet much of the text assumes 
he is telling us about real space, real scientific laws etc. while remaining non-committal 
about some axioms. The mathematics of Principles is thus far from pure. It is more like 
Kant’s synthetic a priori principles, which Kant thinks cannot be brought into serious doubt. 
As Hylton points out, at the time of writing Principles, and for some time later, Russell did 
think mathematics and logic are synthetic a priori (Hylton, 1990:161–161, 197–198). Russell 
(1937:18–19) presents the key argument for the claim. Despite his attempts to escape from 
the influence of German and British idealism, Russell displays the influence of Kant when 
he assumes, synthetic a priori, that classical logic necessarily applies to everything, past, 




not consider these things because he is a Platonic atomist, not because the 
equations themselves compel this interpretation.11 
Russell gave up aspects of Platonic atomism in his later work. By the time 
he wrote OKE (1914), he no longer regarded non-existent objects as things 
which have being in a Platonic realm. He also seems to have given up the 
view by then or soon after that there is a logico-mathematical realm with 
which we are acquainted. However, he does not seem to have changed his 
eternalist view of existents and time, or his tendency to assume that what is 
true of the ways in which we define things in logic or mathematics is true of 
the world if it produces the only available consistent picture of the world. In 
this way, he continued to be a kind of Platonist despite changes in his other 
views. This is why I would still call him a Platonist. 
His comments in the introduction to the second (1938) edition of Principles 
indicate his attitude.  
 
The doctrines of Pythagoras, which began with arithmetical mysticism, 
influenced all subsequent philosophy and mathematics more profoundly 
than is generally realised. Numbers were immutable and eternal, like the 
heavenly bodies; numbers were intelligible: the science of numbers was the 
key to the universe … Consequently, to say that numbers are symbols which 
mean nothing seems a horrible form of atheism. At the time when I wrote the 
‘Principles’, I shared with Frege a belief in the Platonic reality of numbers, 
which, in my imagination, peopled the timeless realm of Being. It was a 
comforting faith which I later abandoned with regret. (Russell, 1938:ix–x) 
 
Russell abandoned parts of his “comforting faith”, but in very influential 
works like OKE, he retained parts of his eternalist Platonic atomism. 
Arguably, this has continued to influence criticisms of Philoponus’s 
traversal argument in modern times. This is not only true of criticisms of the 
traversal argument. For example, solutions to Zeno’s paradoxes often 
presented by philosophers involve the assumption that time consists of 
instants and space consists of points because standard accounts of calculus 
include points and instants (e.g. Grunbaum, 1967). Russell, unlike some later 
philosophers, was very well aware that there might not be points and  
                                                          
11 Nancy Cartwright has argued in a number of works that causal notions are essential to 
science. See, for instance, Cartwright, 1994. Mathias Frisch has recently argued that real 
physics, as opposed to philosophical caricatures of physics, is riddled with causal claims 
(Frisch, 2014). I have no space to discuss his claims here. 
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instants. He struggled with the fact that it seems to be impossible to tell 
whether there are such things. He tried to deal with the problem in a way 
that was consistent with his empiricism (e.g. Russell, 1926:119ff.). 
Why does logic-influenced philosophy often assume aspects of Platonic 
atomism? One reason is the influence of the view that the real world, as 
opposed to the world of appearance, must be consistent because it must be 
coherent and completely determinate. This view may be present in 
Parmenides, but it is more clearly there in Plato’s critique of Heraclitus, 
Cratylus and Protagoras in the Theaetetus.12 A related reason is found in 
Plato’s view that geometry gives us the complete truth unlike the flowing 
world of appearance (Republic, 526cff.). Perhaps Russell is right in thinking 
that his view of mathematics originates in Pythagoras. It is much more 
clearly there in Plato. For the Anglo-Hegelians that taught Russell, the 
absolute is the only thing that is fully consistent, and hence the only thing 
that is fully real. Even mathematics does not deal with eternal truths. In the 
tradition they inherited from Plato via Hegel, it was assumed that our 
everyday world is not consistent and, in some sense, not fully real. Russell 
turned this around by arguing that nineteenth century German mathematics 
was not only useful and precise, but the key to the everyday world. In this 
way, he treated mathematical formalisms as if they were the key to reality 
despite the fact that he was always aware that they might not be. Like Plato 
and his Anglo-Hegelian predecessors, he continued to assume that 
consistency is a key to true reality. His logico-mathematical eternalism is, 
indeed, a footnote to Plato.13 However, as he sometimes recognised in his 
less Platonic and more empiricist pronouncements, the fact that a 
mathematical theory is the only consistent and paradox free theory available 
is not a sufficient ground for thinking that it is true. He could not rule out 
the possibility that another consistent theory might become available, and 
he could not countenance as a possibility that an inconsistent theory might 
be the key to reality. 
  
                                                          
12 Most importantly at 177c–183c. 
13 “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists 







We have seen that Russell’s critique of Philoponus’ traversal argument in its 
Kantian form is toothless without a metaphysical background in which time 
is treated as eternal. Russell realised that he needed this metaphysical 
background when he was writing parts of Principles but seems to have 
forgotten it later. We cannot adequately judge the merits of the traversal 
argument without assessing temporal eternalism, and I have no space to do 
that here. I have, however, shown that a purely logical critique of the 
traversal argument is toothless and that to properly assess the argument we 
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Appendix – Analysis of Philoponus’s argument 
 
1) Time consists of equal non-zero size time units (monades). 
2) If a dynamic theory of time is true, time has come into existence 
successively as a series of monades. 
3) If a dynamic theory of time is true, each unit of time (except a first unit) 
can only come into existence when its predecessor has come into existence 
before it. 
4) A dynamic theory of time is true. 
5) There cannot exist a present member of an infinite series of time units in 
which each member, past and present, could only come into existence after 
its predecessor has come into existence (“after” is here used in the dynamic 
theory sense). (Inferred from premises 1 to 4 plus the meaning of “infinite”). 
6) No unit of time can come into existence that has an infinite series of units 
pre-ceding it coming into existence in succession before it. (Inferred from 
premises 1 to 5). 
7) All units preceding a present unit are past units that came into existence 
in succession before it. 
8) A present unit exists. Thus,  
9) there cannot be an infinite number of past units.  
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It can be seen from various remarks I have quoted that Russell accepts 
premise 5. Further, in a discussion of Zeno, he explicitly says “[I]f you set to 
work to count the terms in an infinite collection, you will never have 
completed your task” (Russell, 1926:187).14 
 
                                                          
14 It is interesting to note that, given his preferred metaphysics, Russell is wrong in this claim. 
If time is laid out eternally, there is no reason why it should not include an immortal counter 
who counts in monades all the natural numbers from a particular date. Suppose the counter 
counts at a rate of a second per second. The series of his countings, which exists eternally, 
would be in a one to one correspondence to the series of natural numbers with no number 
missing. Of course, there would be no end to the series, but all the natural numbers would 
be counted. Russell seems to have slipped into thinking of time as dynamic in the remark I 
quote. 
